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2Nicholas Sargen
Throughout the earlier part of the postwar
era, the majority of developing countries had
only limited access to international capital mar-
kets, and instead had to rely on official sources
to supply the bulk of their external financing
requirements. In the early 1960's, bilateral of-
ficial assistance accounted for over 60 percent
of the total net flow of resources to developing
countries, while multilateral assistance aver-
aged about 6 percent. Funds supplied by pri-
vate sources-the remaining third-consisted
almost entirely of direct investments and sup-
pliers' credits.
Over the last fifteen years, however, several
developments have occurred to make commer-
cial banks an important financing source to de-
veloping countries. They include (1) rapid
economic growth in the developing countries
and failure of official assistance to keep pace
with this growth; (2) emergence of the Euro-
currency market as a funding source; and (3)
the impact of the oil crisis and the worldwide
recession on the external payments positions
(and hence the credit demands) of the devel-
oping countries. Consequently, commercial-
bank credits today comprise approximately 20
percent of the total net flow of resources to de-
veloping countries, bringing the share of private
financing to nearly half of the total.'
This article reviews the factors contributing
to the rapid growth of commercial-bank lend-
ing to developing countries-primarily the non-
OPEC countries-and addresses itself to two
basic issues. First, how exposed are commer-
cial banks to potential default or rescheduling
problems? Second, to what extent are commer-
cial banks compensated for added risks they
incur in lending to developing countries? The
principal finding is that the differential rate of
return commercial banks receive from investing
in developing countries vis-a-vis developed
countries is low by historic standards. How-
ever, this does not imply that the differential is
insufficient to cover the added risk of default,
given the long-run prospects of the major re-
cipients of commercial-bank credits and given
the institutional arrangements available for
handling their debt problems.
Rise of Commercial-Bank Lending to Developing Countries
As a group, the developing countries
(LDCs) have amassed an impressive economic
record over the last fifteen years. During the
1960's, their real national product rose 5.5 per-
cent annually, in the aggregate, and in the first
half of the 1970's their annual growth ap-
proached 6 percent. These figures far exceed
rates in the first half of the century, when
20
growth in real output averaged two percent,
and less than one percent in per capita terms.
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Economic growth was far from uniform,
however. Nearly half of the lower-income
countries (per capita incomes of $200 or less,
1972 prices) recorded growth rates of less than
one percent per capita in 1960-72, whereas
over 60 percent of the higher-income countriesTable 1
Gross Publicized Eurocurrency Credits
to I.B.R.D. Member Countries
($ mlUions)
Country
Category 1971a 1972a 1973a 1974b 1975b
Developing Countries 1,475 4,080 9,116 9,605 11,530
of which:
Oil Exporters 432 1,117 3,013 773 3,137
Higher-income 918 2,632 5,280 6,980 7,216
Middle-income 62 94 507 1,562 1,105
Lower-income 63 130 317 291 71
Industrial Countries 16,915 4,627
2,645 3,771 11,125
Other 2,103 3,373
Total, IBRD Member Countries 4,120 7,851 20,241 28,624 19,530
Non-IBRD members
c 1,108 2,530
Major Developing Country Recipients
Country cumulative
Category 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 '71-'75
Oil Exporters
Algeria 120 275 1,352 500 2,247
Indonesia 98 478 348 1,536 2,460
Iran 224 461 712 114 245 1,756
Venezuela 78 258 63 58 200 657
Higher-income
Argentina 50 264 87 559 34 994
Brazil 212 577 715 1,668 2,069 5,241
Greece 60 330 600 438 239 1,667
Mexico 140 509 1,572 1,478 2,159 5,858
Peru 209 734 366 423 1,732
Spain 420 253 467 1,169 931 3,240
Yugoslavia 10 255 235 549 73 1,122
Middle or
Lower-income
Philippines 61 883 213 1,157
South Korea 40 30 142 264 312 788
Zaire 55 90 287 71 27 530
aSource: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Development Co-operation Review, 1973-74. Data on Euro-
currency loans are based on tombstone advertisements, which were not as commonly used in 1971-72 as in
later years.
bSource: IMF Survey, February 16, 1975.
cPrimarily represents lending to Socialist Bloc countries and Hong-Kong. Major 1974-75 recipients are Poland ($894
million), USSR ($750 million) and Hong Kong ($715 million).
21(over $375 per capita) had growth rates of U.S., as well as intensification of controls on
more than 3 percent per capita. As bilateral capital inflows in the major European countries
assistance became increasingly scarce in the and Japan, which affected borrowings of their
1960's, a larger percentage of the restricted residents from the Eurocurrency market."
flow was concentrated in the poorest countries. The flow of medium-term credits from banks
Consequently, a number of the higher-income operating in the Eurocurrency market (includ-
developing countries were forced to seek alter- ing credits syndicated and funded by foreign
native sources of financing to sustain their high branches of U.S. banks) has grown rapidly since
growth rates. Multilateral lending institutions 1971. The amount of Euro-credits with matur-
were able to narrow the gap by extending ities over a year, for example, increased from an
credits through their "hard loan" windows, but estimated $1.5 billion in 1971 to an estimated
they could not completely satisfy the large loan $11.5 billion in 1975 (Table 1). Flows from
demands of these rapidly growing countries. banks in the U.S. market, on the other hand,
Commercial banks in the Eurocurrency mar- have increased from less than $1 billion in 1971
ket and in the United States began lending to to about $7 billion in 1975 (Table 2). Most of
developing countries on an extensive basis in this growth in U.S. bank (head-office) claims
the early 1970's. The developing countries on LDC's, however, reflects increases in short-
benefited from a change in Eurocurrency mar- term credits (a year or less), which are related
ket conditions, from a phase of strong demand to trade financing, whereas U.S. long-term
for funds at high interest rates in 1969-70 to a credits have grown at a slower pace. Excluding
phase of rapidly increasing supply in 1971. short-term loans, developing countries received
The shift reflected the large-scale replacement about 45 percent of the commercial bankcredits
of funds previously borrowed by banks in the extended abroad since 1971. The latter have
Table 2
Claims on Foreigners Reported by Banks in the United Statesa
($ millions)
long Term Claims
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changes in short term claims
Short term
Claims Outstanding Nov.
Region As of Dec. 31, 1975 1971 1972 1973 1914 1915
Developing Country Totalb 18,492 608 907 1,473 5,963 5,432
Total, all countries 49,683 2,368 2,199 5,049 18,307 10,653
aLong term claims are those over a year, while short-term claims are those a year or less.
bTotal for Latin America (except Bahamas, Panama, Netherlands Antilles), Asia (excluding Hong Kong and Japan),
Africa, and Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.
Source: U.S. Treasury Bulletin, February 1976.
22been heavily concentrated in a small number of
higher-income developing countries. Three
countries in this group-Brazil, Mexico, and
Spain-received nearly 40 percent of the long-
term credits extended to developing countries
since 1971, and roughly half of the credits made
in the last two years.
Federal Reserve data collected from 21 large
U.S. banks indicate that about two-thirds of
total U.S. bank lending to the non-OPEC devel-
oping countries is concentrated at the six largest
banks-Bank of America, Citibank, Chase
Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers
Hanover, and Chemical (Table 3). As of De-
cember 31, 1975, the six banks had almost $12
billion in loans outstanding to a select group of
developing countries, representing about 5 per-
cent of their total assets. Claims on Mexico and
Brazil were each about 1Y2 percent of total
assets of the six largest banks, whereas claims
on all other developing countries were less than
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Mexico 5,810 3,573 2,614 1,480
Brazil 5,540 3,734 2,980 1,924
South Korea 1,473 972 313 184
Argentina 1,071 725 242 144
Peru 1,066 665 492 311
Colombia 756 571 157 111
Philippines 740 597 237 181
Taiwan 677 397 143 78
India 197 178 105 105
Egypt 177 162 31 26
Zaire 162 123 120 116
Zambia 99 99 18 18
Uruguay 54 54
Pakistan 51 51
Guatemala 38 23 23 12
Total claims on
15 countries 17,911 11,924 7,475 4,690
Memorandum ---------
Total Loans 218,397 136,078
Total Assets 394,094 237,621
aData are for 21 banks reporting foreign assets and liabilities for Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations
(ChurchCommittee). Thesedatainclude claimsheld by head offices and significantbranchesandpro-rata shareofclaims
held by significant majority-owned subsidiaries with intra-bank claims netted out; the data exclude claims guaranteed
by any agency ofthe U.S. Government(such as the Export-Import Bank), and claims on which reporting banks believed
they had an enforceable guarantee from a U.S. corporation.
bBank of America, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers Hanover, and Chemical.
Source: "Memorandumon ForeignAssets and Liabilities ofU.S. Banks" prepared for Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations by staff ofthe Federal Reserve Board.
23Source' World Bank, World Debt Tables, Vols. I-II. World Bank data excludes all debts
with maturity ofone year or less as well as private non-guaranteed external debt.
The price deflator used is the LDC export-price index, excluding oiL (1967 = 100),
~xtrapolations are based on DEeD estimates of net long-term borrowings ofoil-
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Prior to the oil crisis (1967-72), the external
public debt of non-OPEC developing countries
(public and publicly guaranteed external debt
over a year's maturity) grew at a steady rate of
14 percentperannum, while debt service grew at
an annual rate of 13 percent (Chart 2). There
was a noticeable acceleration in debt outstand-
ing and debt service in 1973, but this was offset
byextraordinarily high commodity prices. Thus,
when deflated by the LDC export-price index,
excluding oil (1967= 100), the 1973 figures
show no acceleration in growth of "real" debt
service payments, and a decline in "real" debt
outstanding. Similarly, other debt-burden indi-
cators (e.g., debt service as a percent of exports
Impactofthe Oil Crisis and World Recession
Until recently, this trend towards increased ties-the staple exports of developing countries
commercial-bank financing was generally ap- -also began to fall in the latter part of 1974
plauded as a means whereby LDCs could be- from their earlier peak levels, while OECD ex-
come less dependent on official assistance. In port prices continued to rise, and these soften-
the wake of the oil-crisis and worldwide reces- ing terms of trade accentuated the deterioration
sion, however, many analysts have begun a in their trade balance.
critical reappraisal of the situation. According
to OECD estimates, the combined current-ac-
count deficit of all non-OPEC developing coun-
tries reached a record $38 billion in 1975, com-
pared with $26 billion in 1974 and $9 billion
in 1973, so that a question has arisen regarding
the ability of at least some of these countries to
continue accumulating debt at such a rapid rate
without defaults or reschedulings.
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Both structural and cyclical forces help ac-
count for the pronounced deterioration in the
trade situation of non-OPEC developing coun-
tries over the last two years. The initial impact
was structural, as the developing countries en-
countered considerable problems adjusting to
the higher price of OPEC oil. With their con-
sumption of petroleum relatively unchanged
(Chart 1), they have had to spend $10-11 bil-
lion more annuallyfor oil imports thanin 1973.
5
Their annual exports to OPEC countries, on the
other hand, have increased by only $1 billion.
In addition, food and fertilizer supply shortages
and price increasesfor otherimports in 1973-74
posed further problems, especially for the worst-
hit countries in Asiaand Africa. Altogether, oil,
food, and fertilizer imports cost non-OPEC de-
veloping countries about $14 billion more in
1974 than in 1973, and this represented more
than 80 percent of theircurrent-account decline.
In contrast, most of the $12.5-billion trade
deterioration in 1975 reflected cyclical influ-
ences, as developing countries lagged the in-
dustrial countries into recession. The volume
of non-OPEC developing country exports to
OECD countries rose far less rapidly in 1974
than in 1973 (8.5 percent vs. 16.5 percent),
and then actually declined in 1975. Their im-
port volume from OECD countries, however,
did not begin to slow down until well into the
second half of 1974. Prices of raw commodi-
248
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private banks. These countries had combined
current-account deficits of over $18 billion in
1974 and $20 billion in 1975, but their 1975
increase was considerably smaller than the aver-
age for other developing countries. Thus, their
share of the combined non-OPEC LDCcurrent-
account deficit fell from 70 percent in 1974 to
about 55 percent in 1975, and it is expected to
fall further in 1976.
Six of the countries (Brazil, Republic of
China, Greece, Mexico, Spain and Yugoslavia)
were able at the least to prevent sizeable deteri-
orations in their international accounts in 1975
through a combination of reduction in growth
rates and stabilization of inflation rates. Three
other countries (Mexico, Peru, and the Philip-
pines) recorded substantial increases in their
current-account deficits, albeit relatively modest
reductions in real growth rates.
9 Finally, three
Charl2
Comparison of Reductions in Petroleum Consumption and GNP






or of GNP) indicate no dramatic changes in
1973 compared with other periods.
Although World Bank data are not available
beyond 1973, it is possible to make rough es-
timates of the external public debt of develop-
ing countries from OECD balance-of-payments
data. On this basis, net long-term borrowing
of the oil-importing countries was about $15
billion in 1974 and $20 billion in 1975.
6 These
figures, added to external debt outstanding in
the previous year (disbursements basis), yield
total debt estimates of $87 billion in 1974 and
$106 billion in 1975.
These 1974-75 estimates are not exactly com-
parable with World Bank data for earlier per-
riods since they include total net commercial
bank credits from the Euro-currency and U.S.
markets with over one year's maturity, whereas
World Bank data omit private debt which is not
publicly guaranteed.
7 Precise comparisons thus
cannot be made, but it is still fairly evident that
there has been a marked acceleration in LDC
external debt in nominal terms. Our estimates,
for example, suggest an annual rate of increase
ofover 20 percentinthe last two years.
It is less apparent what has happened to the
LDC debt burden in real terms. Real debt
outstanding probably declined substantially in
1974 as a result offavorable export price move-
ments, but increased in 1975 when commodity
prices fell. Our estimates, based on fragmen-
tary export price data for 1975, indicate an ac-
celerated growth of real debt outstanding-an
annual rate of about 11.5 percent in 1974-75,
compared with 8 percent in 1967-73. This
means, however, that debt has grown much
more slowly in real terms than in nominal
terms.
8
Sources: For developed countries, F.E.A., Monthly Energy Review, January 1976. For developing
countries, Wouter Tims, "The Developing Countries," Chapter 5 inHigher Oil Prices and the
World Economy, Edward Fried and Charles Schultze, eds., Brookings Institution, 1975.
25 hSources: For Developed Countries: GEeD, Economic Outlook. For developing countries, 1975.
Balance of Payments Prospects
From the commercial-bank standpoint, the
relevant issue is how readily the countries with
substantial bank debts can adjust to higher oil
prices and world business-cycle fluctuations.
Among the key areas to watch are the twelve
countries shown in Table 4, which account for
over 80 percent of long-term outstanding debt






u.S. Japan Western Non-OPEC
Europe LDCsof the countries (Argentina, Chile and Zaire)
each suffered a sizeable reduction in its real
growth rate and a substantial deterioration in its
trade account.
The debt problems of these three countries,
however, were only remotely related to oil.
Rampant inflation and political instability con-
tributed to the foreign-exchange crises in Ar-
gentina and Chile, where consumer prices have
increased over 200 percent and over 300 per-
cent, respectively for 12-month periods ending
in late 1975. Inflation and government spend-
ing were also factors in Zaire, although the for-
eign-exchange crisis there was ultimately trig-
gered by a sharp drop in the world price of
copper."
O
None of these three countries has formally
defaulted in the sense of repudiating its debt,
and all three are now developing programs to
improve their long-run balance of payments
Country
Table 4
Economic Indicators of Twelve Non-OPEC lDC's
With large Commercial Bank Debts
Current Accounta Growth Ratea
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countries -17.5 +10 (+1 to -2.75) 12.6 10.7
aSources: For Greece, Spain, Yugoslavia, OECDEconomic Outlook, December 1975. For all othercountries, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co., World Financial Markets, January 1976.
bSource: IFS Survey, March 1976. 1975 inflation rates in parentheses are percent changes in last 12 months. All others
are averages of montWy changes.
26prospects. In early 1975, for example, the
Chilean government agreed to a set of mea-
sures recommended by the International Mone-
tary Fund, which included imposition of new
taxes, a freeze on public employment, tightened
credit to the private sector, and adoption of
flexible exchange-rate policies." Last Decem-
ber, the government of Zaire also requested
I.M.P. assistance to develop a stabilization pro-
gram, and Argentina is expected to follow suit.
Meanwhile, Argentine authorities have under-
taken a series of extensive devaluations, de-
signed to stimulate the export trade and im-
prove the trade balance.
In sum, prospects for most of the major reci-
pients of commercial-bank loans suggest an im-
proving trend in current accounts. Their export
growth rates should revive due to recovery in the
OECD nations, while their import growth
should continue to slacken as their domestic
economies slow down. Even in instances where
countries have incurred debt problems, more-
over, the causes are largely unrelated to oil but
are predominantly related to domestic difficul-
ties. In these cases, the key to an improved
long-run trade position is the ability to bring
inflation rates back into line with those of other
countries.
Average premium on loansto lDCs
First, we were interested in the premium
investors receive on credits to developing coun-
tries compared with their credits to developed
countries. This involves an analysis of the most
typical form of Euro-credit, a revolving credit
at a floating interest rate. Funds are drawn as
a short-term advance, usually renewable at the
end of three-month or six-month periods
(called the "renewal period" or "rollover pe-
riod") for a designated term (called the "com-
mitment period"). Rates to borrowers are
quoted on the basis of the three-month or six-
month LIBOR rate plus the "spread." The lat-
ter covers overhead cost, profit, and risk, and
is determined on the basis of the borrower's
creditworthiness and competitiveness of the
market when the commitment is made.
The first regression equation in Table 5 illus-
trates how the spread varied depending (1) on
the recipient of the Euro-credit, whether de-
Market Assessment of Developing Country Risk
The recent debate over commercial bank 1975-altogether, 67 loans to developed coun-
lending to developing countries has focused tries, totaling $3.8 billion, and 177 loans to de-
attention on the alleged high risks entailed in veloping countries amounting to $10.0 billion.
LDC loans. Economic theory, however, leads Information in each case included the borrower
one to expect that commercial banks will re- and borrowing country; the leading creditor in-
quire added compensation if they perceive de- stitutions; the month of the loan agreement; the
faults or reschedulings on LDC loans to be amount of the credit; the commitment period;
greater than those on loans to developed coun- and the spread over the London Inter-Bank
tries. Hence, commercial banks will not neces- Offer Rate (LIBOR).
sarily be vulnerable to LDC external-debt
problems, provided their perception of LDC
lending risk is generally accurate. On the other
hand, if commercial banks systematically un-
derstate the risks involved in lending to devel-
oping countries, the added revenues they re-
ceive on LDC loans will not be sufficient to
cover the added costs incurred, and their profit
and liquidity positions will be squeezed by
LDC defaults or reschedulings. In examining
developing country lending risk, therefore, it is
important to separate two issues: (1) On what
basis do commercial banks form their percep-
tion of LDC lending risks, and to what extent
are they compensated for the added perceived
risk? (2) Is the market perception of LDC
lending risk "correct"-i.e. is the compensation
sufficient to cover added costs?
To answer these questions, we have analyzed
data compiled by the World Bank on publicized
Eurocurrency credits completed between the
third quarter of 1974 and the third quarter of
27veloped or developing country, (2) on the date
of commitment, whether 1974 or 1975, and
(3) on the length of the commitment period.
Each of the variables is statistically significant,
although the maturity of the loan has a rela-
tively small coefficient and small t-statistic. The
latter finding is not surprising, however, in view
of the variable interest rates on Euro-credits.12
The regression results show that borrowers
from developing countries paid an average
spread of about 140 basis points in 1974,
whereas developed country borrowers paid
about 25 basis points less on average, reflecting
the lower perceived lending risks. In 1975, al-
though the spread was about 40 basis points
higher for each of the two groups, the LDC-
DC differential did not change significantly.
Expressed as a percentage of borrowing costs
(LIBOR + spread), the developing-country
premium translared into an additional 2-to-3




Further analysis takes into consideration the
fact that there are variations within the group
of developing countries. Typically, they are
separated into prime and non-prime categories,
based in part on each country's per capita in-
come. The second regression in Table 5 takes
Table 5
Regression Results: Variations in Spreads on Euro-credits, 1974.3-1975.3a
(t-statistics in parentheses)
(i) Developed (DC) and Developing Country loansb
Average reduction Average
Spread = for 1975
Constant developed countries increase Maturityd
R2 .48 1.41 -.25 .40 -.017
D.W. 1.58 (18.3) (6.70) (10.4) (1.78)
S.E.E. = .25
D.F. 240
(Ii) Developing Countries OnlyC
Debtd Avg.
Spread = Income Mexico Service Inflationd 1975
Constant "effect" "effect" Ratio Rate increase Maturityd
R2 .54 1.46 .10 -.27 .006 .005 .26 -.04
D.W. 1.86 (15.9) (2.80) (4.40) (2.35) (3.80) (5.58) (3.96)
S.E.E. = .21
D.F. 170
aData Source: World Bank, Borrowing in International Capital Markets. 5 issues, November 1974-November 1975.
bR . ., f" S d {LDC=O} {1974=0} (M' ) egressIon equatIOn IS 0 ,orm: prea = ao + a, DC =1 + a2 1975 =1 = a3' atunty .
Hence, the constant term can be interpreted as the average 1974 LDC spread, unadjusted for maturity.
C _ {High Inc. =O} { Other=O}. • { 1974=0 LDCSpread-bo+b, Other =1 +b2 Mex. =1 +b3 (DebtSer.)+b. (lnf.)+bs 1975=1 +b6 ·(Mat.)
Hence, the constant term can be interpreted as the average 1974 spread for higher-income LDCs, unadjusted for
maturity, debt-service ratio, and the inflation rate.
dCoefficient must be multiplied by the value of the variable. Maturities are usually 5-8 years; debt-service ratios are
generally between 10-20%; inflation rates are usually in the 15-30% range.
28this into account by distinguishing between
higher-income countries and lower- or middle-
income countries (using World Bank defini-
tions). In addition, we have included a sep-
arate dummy variable for Mexico, in view of
that country's long experience as a borrower in
international capital markets.
The choice of other variables is less clear-
cut. For example, banks differentiate between
government and private borrowers, but that dis-
tinction is not very meaningful if a loan to a
private borrower carries a government guaran-
tee, or if the institution is quasi-official. The
data also indicate that project risk is less im-
portant than country risk in setting spreads
14
-but there is no generally accepted frame-
work for assessing country default risk. In the
absence of such a framework, analysts have
tended to use those economic indicators which
reflect a country's capacity to service its debt,
although there is no general agreement as to
which indicators are important in this regard.
Despite the large number of possible measures,
we have limited ourselves to two of the most
commonly used; first, the inflation rate, and
second, the debt-service ratio, i.e., the propor-
tion of foreign-exchange earnings oncurrent ac-
count absorbed by public-debt service.'5
All the variables included in the regression
are statistically significant and have the antici-
pated signs. The coefficients of the inflation
variable and the debt service variable are quite
small, however, so that each adds only about
10 basis points to the spread on average, as-
suming a 20-percent inflation rate and IS-per-
cent debt-service ratio. Lower and middle in-
come countries paid only about 10 basis points
more than higher income countries, whereas
Mexico paid about 25 basis points less than
other higher income countries and about 35
basis points less than lower-middle income
countries. In sum, no single factor appears to
dominate in explaining variations in LDC
spreads, although Mexico clearly is in a sep-
arate category from other developing countries.
It is also instructive to note how commercial
banks responded to the large LDC trade defi-
29
cits. The regression indicates that developing
country spreads increased about 25 basis points
on average between the second half of 1974
and the first three quarters of 1975. Increases in
spreads formajorEurocurrencyborrowers other
than Mexico, however, were well above the de-
veloping country average. The spread which
Brazil paid, for example, increased from 3;.4 of
one percent on 12-year loans in late 1974 to
1% percent for 5-year loans in 1975, while the
spread for Spain increased from 1 percent on
8-year loans to 13;.4 percent on 5-year loans.
Hence, the relatively small difference in spreads
between higher-income countries and lower-
middle income countries reflects, in part, bank-
ers' revised perceptions of lending risks to heavy
borrowers. Countries which incurred debt prob-
lems generally paid the highest spreads, in addi-
tion to experiencing sharp reductions in new
lending flows.
Comparisonswith earlierperiods
Comparisons of Eurocurrency loan premi-
ums over longer time periods are difficult to
make, since calculations for earlier periods are
based on bond flotations rather than bank
loans. The evidence, however, strongly sug-
gests that the premium attached to portfolio
investment in developing countries today may
well be at an all-time low. The yield premium
between developed and developing country
bond issues is much lower today than in 1958-
65, when the average LDC yield was nearly
one-half to two-thirds higher than that of high-
grade U.S. domestic corporate bonds, and be-
tween one-third and one-half higher than that
on Canadian issues.'G Differential yields in the
1920's were somewhat smaller (40 percent
over U.S. corporate bonds and 25 percent over
Canadian public issues in the U.S.), but still
well above the differential developing countries
pay today.
The narrowing LDC premium in part reflects
the increasingly impressive economic perfor-
mance of the higher-income developing coun-
tries. While these countries have been adversely
affected by the events of the last several years,their prospects today are still considerably
brighter than they were fifteen or twenty years
ago. In addition, the banking system has devel-
oped various risk-reducing mechanisms, such as
variable interest rates, for example, or syndi-
cated bank loans, which provide a means of
spreading country risks that are borne by indi-
vidual banks.
Finally, attitudes towards default have
changed considerably since the 1930's and
1940's, when there were massive LDC defaults
on bond issues. At that time, developing coun-
tries which encountered foreign-exchange crises
had little incentive or option to avoid default.
"Priorto the GreatDepression, external long-
term debt consisted primarily of bond issues
floated abroad. Only rarely could a refunding
be arranged prior to actual default. Then some
agreement had to be reached by the debtor and
the bondholders, often represented by commit-
tees, which could not bind the bondholders but
could merely recommend acceptance of the
proposal. In some instances the debtor made a
unilateral offer to the private creditors, which
they could accept as the alternative to not being
repaid at all. The governments of the creditors
were not parties to the agreements, though they
could use diplomatic means to protect their
nationals."17
The differences in the post-war period are
striking. Since the late 1950'sthere have been at
least 25 instances, involving 15 different coun-
tries, where debt arrearages have had to be ne-
gotiatedY Governments of creditor and debtor
nations were parties to the negotiations, and
the outcome in each case was a rescheduling of
a country's debt, rather than outright default.
Given present institutional arrangements for
handling debt problems, the likelihood of a de-
veloping country repudiating its debt is now
perceived to be quite low.
Past experience suggests that the market's
perception of LDC risk has not systematically
understated the costs involved. The relevant
issue today, though, is whether the developing
country debt situation will be the same in the
future as in the past. There are few signs to in-
dicate a hardening attitude in creditor govern-
ment attitudes, although governments of some
developing countries have urged a moratorium
on foreign debt-service payments. The more
likely development is that future reschedulings
will involve both official and commercial-bank
credits. One can only speculate, however, as
to how often countries will have to reschedule,
whether bank credits will be rescheduled in pro-
portion to their share of external debt-service
payments, and whether credits will be resched-
uled at market interest rates. The debt nego-
tiations in Argentina, Chile, and Zaire are sig-
nificant because they provide the first test cases
of reschedulings in countries where commer-
cial-bank credits comprise a sizeable portion of
the external debt service. As these negotiations
are concluded, it is possible that the market's
perception of LDC risk could be altered.
Conclusion
It is important to separate two issues in the
debate over commercial-bank lending to devel-
oping countries: (1) Are commercial banks
vulnerable to LDC defaults? (2) Are commer-
cial banks adequately compensated for the
added risks incurred in lending to developing
countries?
On the first issue, our analysis suggests that
fears of significant commercial-bank exposure
to LDC defaults are grossly exaggerated. Some
analysts have focused attention on the record
LDC trade deficits and the debt problems of
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individual developing countries, and have sug-
gested that developing countries, as a group,
are accumulating debt too rapidly. The aggre-
gate trade statistics, however, can be misleading
in a number of respects. First of all, the LDC
current-account deficits do not translate into
comparable increases in net long-term borrow-
ings due to non-bank sources of financing (e.g.
official transfers, direct investment, etc.). Sec-
ond, the distinction between nominal debt ac-
cumulation and real debt accumulation is sel-
dom made, even though LDC debt apparentlyhas grown much less in real terms than in nom-
inalterms. Third, countries which are major re-
cipients of commercial-bank credits are in a far
better position to adjust to external shocks than
are most other developing countries. Several
countries have experienced debt problems, but
their difficulty, most likely, is one of reschedul-
ing rather than default. Moreover, their loans
comprise a very small fraction of U.S. bank
assets.
On the second issue, we find that commer-
cial banks have responded to higher perceived
risks through above-average increases in
spreads to major borrowers and to countries
with debt problems, and through the curtail-
ment of lending to those with debt problems.
Still, the differentialrate of return between de-
veloped and developing country loans appears
low by historic standards. However, this does
not imply that the differential is insufficient to
cover added lending risks, especially in view of
governments' increasing tendency to minimize
the possibility of default.
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